Full Report

The numbers behind PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk: as-reported financial statements and company metrics for FY2021–FY2025, traced to the source filings, opened with the share-price history those statements have to justify. Every linked figure opens the exact page of the filing it was printed on, with the statement row highlighted. Amounts in IDR millions unless noted.

Reading notes: Saratoga Investama Sedaya is an investment holding company: it has no operating revenue line. The tab's revenue breakdown is the company's own reported segment disclosure - Income (loss), defined in the note as net gain (loss) on investments in shares and other securities plus dividend and interest income - which is negative in loss years such as FY2023. All figures are in millions of Rupiah, the unit the audited statements are printed in ('Expressed in millions of Rupiah, unless otherwise stated'). Earnings per share are in whole Rupiah as printed. FY2021-FY2025 statement figures are each taken from that year's own annual report (audited consolidated financial statements, Exhibits A-D). FY2016-FY2020 figures in the long-term record come from the standardized data feed and carry no page links, except FY2020, which is cited to the comparative column of the FY2021 annual report. Segment definitions changed in the FY2021 filing: the pre-2021 scheme (Infrastructure / Natural resources / Consumer products / Head office and others) was replaced wholesale by Blue Chip / Digital technology / Growth focused / Others. The FY2021 annual report prints a bridge restating FY2020 onto the new scheme, so FY2020 is comparable; FY2016-FY2019 long-term totals are sums of the old-scheme segments and are shown without page links.

Share Price — Available History Since January 2026

The stock closed at IDR 1,760 on Jul 27, 2026 — down 4% over the window shown, trading between IDR 1,250 and IDR 2,010. At that close the stock trades at 3.3× FY2025 diluted EPS as reported below.

Source: market price feed, daily closes, Jan 2026–Jul 2026 — the feed marks this available history as partial. Price return only, excludes dividends.

FY2025 at a Glance

Source: FY2025 consolidated statements [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Income (Loss) by Segment

Income (Loss) by Segment	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Blue Chip	21,682,759	6,378,796	(11,095,896)	5,848,803	5,583,992
Digital technology	455,729	(237,294)	(71,730)	(265,765)	(299,539)
Growth focused	3,854,142	139,609	155,056	(287,986)	1,498,309
Others	72,271	57,563	9,535	32,238	223,757
Total income (loss)	26,064,901	6,338,674	(11,003,035)	5,327,290	7,006,519

Source: Notes to the consolidated financial statements — Segment Information. Segment income is net gain (loss) on investments in shares and other securities plus dividend and interest income. [5] [6] [7] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Income Statement

Source: Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income (audited), as printed in each year's annual report. [1] [2] [3] [4]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Columns marked E are consensus analyst estimates from S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ), shown alongside reported results for direct comparison; they are not company guidance.

Estimate source: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) consensus, as of 2026-07-28. Estimate figures are S&P Capital IQ consensus (vendor data — no filing page links). EPS and net income use the normalized (adjusted) consensus where the street reports it.

Balance Sheet

Source: Consolidated Statements of Financial Position (audited). Saratoga presents an unclassified balance sheet — no current / non-current subtotals and no split of borrowings between current and long-term. [9] [10] [11] [12]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Cash Flow

Source: Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (audited). Saratoga reports operating cash flows by the direct method; in FY2021-FY2023 capital expenditure and the investing subtotal are printed as a single combined line. [13] [14] [15] [16]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Reportable Segment Assets

Reportable Segment Assets	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Blue Chip	50,878,980	54,699,022	41,213,477	45,517,065	48,735,010
Digital technology	1,319,818	1,262,781	1,177,199	933,841	716,151
Growth focused	7,585,110	6,157,859	6,394,939	7,392,667	9,459,953
Others	1,367,619	1,651,488	2,159,505	3,998,284	3,599,728
Total segment assets	61,151,527	63,771,150	50,945,120	57,841,857	62,510,842

Source: Notes to the consolidated financial statements — Segment Information. [5] [6] [7] [8]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Long-Term Record

Fiscal year	Total income (loss)	Profit (loss) before tax	Profit (loss) for the year	Diluted earnings (loss) per share	Net cash from (for) operating activities	Total equity
FY2016	7,478,300	6,585,135	5,703,425	417	292,736	19,366,537
FY2017	3,815,061	3,250,592	3,161,638	241	1,922,507	22,287,359
FY2018	(6,178,886)	(6,685,056)	(6,134,832)	(454)	(378,929)	15,964,248
FY2019	8,241,125	7,738,088	7,344,118	539	674,502	22,774,165
FY2020	9,186,701	8,693,225	8,823,332	643	366,699	31,396,627
FY2021	26,064,901	25,696,068	24,891,826	1,825	(362,643)	56,014,782
FY2022	6,338,674	5,858,672	4,626,223	338	3,707,312	59,816,437
FY2023	(11,003,035)	(11,309,265)	(10,151,341)	(741)	1,407,919	48,788,224
FY2024	5,327,290	4,915,226	3,291,496	240	(1,031,484)	51,772,808
FY2025	7,006,519	6,608,617	7,322,326	538	1,384,281	58,918,834

Source: consolidated statements across filings; older years from the standardized feed [5] [13] [1] [9]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Operating KPIs

KPI	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Net Asset Value	56,316,000	60,931,000	48,854,000	53,985,000	60,284,000
Net Asset Value per share	4,152	4,492	3,601	3,980	4,444
Sum of investee companies (portfolio value)	59,799,000	61,619,000	49,116,000	55,655,000	60,768,000

Source: company-reported operating metrics [17] [18] [19] [20]. Click any linked figure to open the filing page with the row highlighted.

Analyst Consensus

Street ratings: 1 strong buy, 1 buy. Consensus: Strong Buy.

Estimate source: S&P Capital IQ (CapIQ) consensus, as of 2026-07-28. Estimate figures are S&P Capital IQ consensus (vendor data — no filing page links). EPS and net income use the normalized (adjusted) consensus where the street reports it.

Traceability

429 of 453 figures on this page (95%) link to the filing page where they are printed — click a linked figure to open the source PDF at that page with the row highlighted. Unlinked figures come from standardized data feeds or pre-filing years.

• Saratoga Investama Sedaya is an investment holding company: it has no operating revenue line. The tab's revenue breakdown is the company's own reported segment disclosure - Income (loss), defined in the note as net gain (loss) on investments in shares and other securities plus dividend and interest income - which is negative in loss years such as FY2023.

• All figures are in millions of Rupiah, the unit the audited statements are printed in ('Expressed in millions of Rupiah, unless otherwise stated'). Earnings per share are in whole Rupiah as printed.

• FY2021-FY2025 statement figures are each taken from that year's own annual report (audited consolidated financial statements, Exhibits A-D). FY2016-FY2020 figures in the long-term record come from the standardized data feed and carry no page links, except FY2020, which is cited to the comparative column of the FY2021 annual report.

• Segment definitions changed in the FY2021 filing: the pre-2021 scheme (Infrastructure / Natural resources / Consumer products / Head office and others) was replaced wholesale by Blue Chip / Digital technology / Growth focused / Others. The FY2021 annual report prints a bridge restating FY2020 onto the new scheme, so FY2020 is comparable; FY2016-FY2019 long-term totals are sums of the old-scheme segments and are shown without page links.

• Income-statement labels follow the FY2025 annual report. Earlier filings word some lines differently - FY2022 and FY2023 print 'Dividend, interest and investment income' where FY2024-FY2025 print 'Dividend and interest income', and FY2021-FY2022 print 'other equity securities' where later years print 'other securities'. The amounts are on the same basis.

• Saratoga presents an unclassified balance sheet: no current / non-current subtotals and no split of borrowings between current and long-term in any year.

• The Net Asset Value KPIs are taken from the Management Discussion and Analysis value-generation table, which is printed in IDR billion. Their values are restated into the tab's IDR-millions scale (FY2025 NAV of 60,284 billion is shown as 60,284,000); the citation anchor is the figure as printed on the page.

• Quarterly profit-or-loss and cash-flow statements are printed year-to-date only (three, six and nine months). Quarters after Q1 are derived as the exact difference of two printed year-to-date figures and are marked as such; balance-sheet quarters are point-in-time and are as printed. No quarterly numeric feed exists in this run, so the derived quarters could not be cross-checked against a provider series.

• 5 figure(s) differed between the data feed and the filing; the filing value is shown (see the run's metrics/metrics_tab.json for the audit trail).

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PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk's management explains the business in its own materials. The slides below do the most of that work, pulled from the documents preserved in Sources. Each source link opens the complete presentation at that slide in a new tab.

Investor Presentation — January 2025 — January 2025

Saratoga's own company-overview deck and the fastest route from zero to understanding: what it owns, how it deploys and recycles capital, and how NAV is built. · Open the full document →

2025 Annual Report — performance, structure and NAV exhibits — FY2025

The deck stops at January 2025; these are the annual report's chart and diagram pages, carrying the current portfolio list, ownership map and the full sum-of-the-parts NAV. · Open the full document →

Investor Presentation — November 2024 (appendix) — November 2024

The core of this deck was superseded in January 2025, but its appendix — dropped from later editions — is the only place management maps the nickel and aluminium value chains its holdings sit in. · Open the full document →

More from management

AGM and EGM Material 2026 — 2026 · 27 pages · Management's own summary of FY2025 signed off for shareholders, plus the treasury-share and LTIP allocation put to the May 2026 vote. · Open →

AGM and EGM Material 2025 — 2025 · 47 pages · The full board slate reappointed in 2025 with candidate profiles, and the articles-of-association amendment passed alongside it. · Open →

Investor Presentation — August 2024 — August 2024 · 25 pages · The August edition of the same deck, on 1H24 figures — useful only to see what management was saying before the Brawijaya build-out. · Open →

AGM and EGM Material 2024 — 2024 · 31 pages · The FY2023 performance report and the buyback and treasury-share proposals put to shareholders after a year of NAV decline. · Open →

AGM and EGM Material 2023 — 2023 · 30 pages · The FY2022 report and the LTIP and share-buyback resolutions that set up the treasury-share programme still running today. · Open →

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PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk's annual reports contain management's most considered account of the business. These are the sections, passages and visual pages worth opening in the originals preserved in Sources.

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2025 Annual Report — FY2025

The latest full account of a holding company whose reported profit is almost entirely the mark-to-market of ten investee stakes. · Open the full document →

Saratoga in Brief — p. 12 · Read the full section →

Defines the business in management's own terms: an active investment company that invests, grows and monetizes minority stakes.

Who Saratoga is, then the three activities it labels Invest, Grow and Monetize.

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk. (IDX Code: SRTG) is a leading active investment company in Indonesia with nearly 3 (three) decades of investment experience since its establishment in 1997. Saratoga has built a strong track record across multiple economic cycles, supported by a disciplined and long-term investment approach. […] With a passion for excellence, we actively approach investment opportunities early on where significant value can be added. […] We actively support our investment, leverage our expertise in investment management, sector knowledge, and wideranging access to debt and equity capital markets, locally and internationally. […] We actively manage our investments and provide our investee companies with a broad range of capital market and strategic placement opportunities.

p. 12 · Read in context →

Report of the Board of Directors — p. 23 · Read the full section →

Management's own framing of 2025: where capital was rotated, and the NAV outcome it produced.

Portfolio Highlights — p. 29 · Read the full section →

The asset-by-asset walk — the only place the unlisted holdings, which have no market price, are described at all.

The ADRO/AADI separation that split the largest holding into two listed lines.

In late 2024, ADRO completed its strategic repositioning to focus on mineral processing and renewable energy. Following the separation of its thermal coal subsidiary, PT Adaro Andalan Indonesia Tbk. (AADI), the Company managed its portfolios to concentrate all resources on its metallurgical coal and minerals business operated through PT Alamtri Minerals Indonesia Tbk. (ADMR).

p. 30 · Read in context →

The Digital Realty 50:50 joint venture, the year's main unlisted development.

In March 2025, BDIA reached a significant strategic milestone with the formation of a 50:50 joint venture with Digital Realty, the world’s largest global provider of cloud- and carrier-neutral data center, colocation, and interconnection solutions. […] Through Digital Realty Bersama, the joint venture owns and operates a connected data center campus in Jakarta, consisting of multiple strategically located facilities.

p. 33 · Read in context →

Review of Operations — p. 54 · Read the full section →

States plainly that income is dividends plus fair-value change, then attributes the 180% swing in net gain to two share prices.

The income model, and the TBIG/MDKA re-rating behind the IDR4,140 billion net gain.

Saratoga’s income is principally derived from dividend receipts, realized gains on investment disposals, and changes in the fair value of investments. […] In 2025, Saratoga recorded a net gain IDR4,140 billion from investments in shares and other securities, a significant improvement compared to 2024, when the Company recorded a gain of IDR1,478 billion. This turnaround was primarily attributable to the increase in the share price of PT Tower Bersama Infrastructure Tbk. and PT Merdeka Copper Gold Tbk.

p. 54 · Read in context →

Investments in Shares and Other Equity Securities — p. 57 · Read the full section →

The portfolio at carrying value, holding by holding — the balance sheet a holdco is actually judged on.

Ability to Service Debt — p. 59 · Read the full section →

How a company with no operating revenue funds itself: dividends, divestments and interest, against a 0.8% loan-to-value.

Borrowings more than halved to IDR1,450 billion; LTV down to 0.8% from 3.0%.

As of 31 December 2025, the Company’s total borrowings declined to IDR1,450 billion, compared with IDR3,214 billion as of 31 December 2024, primarily due to the repayment of bank loans. […] As of 31 December 2025, the Company’s loan-to-value (LTV) ratio declined to 0.8% compared to 3.0% in 2024.

p. 59 · Read in context →

Risk Profile — p. 101 · Read the full section →

Two risks specific to this structure: it inherits every industry its investees operate in, and it depends on its founders.

Inherited industry risk across investees, and dependency on founders and key executives.

The Company has investee companies operating across various industries, including the natural resources, infrastructure, and consumer sectors. Each of these industries is subject to its own inherent risks, which may affect the operational performance and financial results of the investee companies and, in turn, the Company's investment outcomes. […] The Company may be exposed to risks arising from its reliance on founders and key executives, as the loss of their services could affect leadership continuity, strategic direction and business performance.

p. 101 · Read in context →

f. Principles of consolidation — p. 130 · Read the full section →

The accounting policy that defines the business model: as an investment entity Saratoga does not consolidate investees, it fair-values them.

Investment-entity status under PSAK 110: controlled entities, associates and JVs all carried at FVTPL.

The Company is a qualifying investment entity stipulated in PSAK 110, “Consolidated Financial Statements”, and accordingly investments in controlled entities - as well as investments in associates and joint ventures are measured at fair value through profit or loss (FVTPL) in accordance with PSAK 109 with the exception of subsidiaries that are considered an extension of the Company’s investing activities (i.e. a subsidiary that is non investment entity (in accordance with PSAK 110) which only provides investment management services to the Company). […] As a result, the Company only consolidates subsidiaries that are non-investment entities (in accordance with PSAK 110) which provide investment management services to the Company (see Note 1e for the list of consolidated subsidiaries).

p. 130 · Read in context →

Valuation of Level 2 and 3 Investments Carried at Fair Value — p. 167 · Read the full section →

The auditor's key audit matter: 55% of assets are valued by judgment rather than by an observable price.

IDR34.5 trillion of Level 2 and 3 investments, 55.26% of consolidated assets, valued on unobservable inputs.

As at 31 December 2025, the Group's investing activities result in various Level 2 and 3 (including investments measured at cost) investments in shares and other securities totaling IDR 34,543,686 million, representing 55.26% of the total consolidated assets. Out of those in Level 2, a total of IDR 25,485,721 million are investments in entities that hold a direct ownership in publicly traded shares. […] Unlike investments in publicly traded equities whose prices are readily observable and therefore more easily independently corroborated, the valuation of these Level 2 and 3 investments is inherently subjective, often involves the use of inputs that are unobservable

p. 167 · Read in context →

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2021 Annual Report — FY2021

Included for one reason: this is the year the segment definitions were replaced wholesale, and the report shows the bridge. · Open the full document →

17. Segment Information — p. 146 · Read the full section →

Sector segments (natural resources, infrastructure, consumer) were retired here for lifecycle buckets, with 2020 restated to match.

The three replacement segments — Blue Chip, Digital Technology, Growth Focused — as first defined.

The Company categories the segment information into 3 (three) main sectors which are the investment target of the Company.

These segments are determined based on the following considerations: […] 1. Blue Chip Companies

Companies included in this category are companies that have a national reputation, both in terms of quality, ability and reliability to operate profitably in various economic situations with good or bad conditions, usually listed as part of LQ45 on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.

2. Digital Technology Companies

Companies defined here are companies that place an emphasis on digitizing business processes and services through sophisticated information technology and systems.

3. Growth Focused Companies

Companies that included in this category are companies that are still in the process of developing both in terms of income, as well as increasing the number of workers so that they can become bigger in the future.

p. 146 · Read in context →

More annual reports

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2024 Annual Report — FY2024 · 167 pages · The base year for every 2025 comparison, and the year borrowings peaked at IDR3.2 trillion and LTV at 3.0%. · Open →

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2023 Annual Report — FY2023 · 157 pages · The loss year: an IDR10.2 trillion mark-to-market loss shows what the same model does when investee prices fall. · Open →

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk — FY2022 Annual Report — FY2022 · 162 pages · The commodity-peak year on the other side of 2023, useful for reading the portfolio through a full cycle. · Open →

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Competitors describe PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk's market in their own filings and calls. These verified passages and visual pages show where their strategies meet, using source documents preserved in Sources.

PT Provident Investasi Bersama Tbk (PALM)

The closest listed analog to Saratoga in Indonesia and the one peer whose filings name Saratoga. PALM sits in the same IDX-IC G512 'Investment Companies' bucket, was built by the Provident founders who co-invested alongside Saratoga for two decades, and holds positions in the same asset families — Merdeka Copper Gold, Merdeka Battery Materials, and, until 2025, logistics and telecom. Its FY2024 register also carried PT Saratoga Sentra Business as a >5% shareholder of PALM itself, and until 17 March 2025 the two shared people as well as assets — PALM's Investment Committee included Michael W. P. Soeryadjaya, disclosed there as President Director of Saratoga since 2015. Read as the mirror of Saratoga's own mandate written by someone chasing the same assets.

PALM's own statement of its investment mandate, from the company-history section of the FY2025 annual report. The sector list — natural resources, technology, media, telecommunications, logistics — overlaps Saratoga's stated pillars almost item for item, and the selection criteria (attractive valuations, growth prospects, solid business models) are the same generic screen. What the passage also dates is how recent the rivalry is: PALM only became an investment company in August 2022, after selling out of palm oil. It is a mandate statement, not evidence of execution.

The Company's transformation continued following the divestment of all plantation-related Subsidiaries, with a new focus as an investment company. This change was accompanied by a name change to PT Provident Investasi Bersama Tbk, effective as of August 23, 2022 pursuant to Deed No. 122/2022 as stated in the Company Profile section of the Annual Report. In carrying out its role, the Company directs investments toward Indonesian companies with attractive valuations, strong growth prospects, and solid business models, particularly in national priority sectors such as natural resources, technology, media, telecommunications, and logistics, while maintaining discipline in risk management and investment.

p. 41 · Read in context →

PALM's supervisory board describing the 2025 rotation: out of logistics and telecommunications, deeper into natural resources, including a first-ever investment in a private (unlisted) gold vehicle in North Sumatra. Two things matter for the comparison with Saratoga. First, the direction of travel — concentrating rather than diversifying, and into gold specifically. Second, the move into a private company, which is where Saratoga has historically claimed an edge. 'Optimal returns' is the board's characterisation; the underlying transactions are itemised on p.52 of the same report.

Hardi Wijaya Liong (President Commissioner) — Report of the Board of Commissioners: During the reporting year, the Board of Directors undertook strategic actions through divestments in the logistics and telecommunications sectors generating optimal returns, while strengthening investment focus through new initiatives in the natural resources sector. The Company, for the first time, made an investment in Aurum, a private entity with strategic ownership in gold exploration and development projects in North Sumatra. […] The Board of Commissioners concurs with the Board of Directors' strategic approach in positioning the Company's investments in the natural resources sector as a key pillar.

p. 21 · Read in context →

The one place in the peer set where Saratoga appears by name in a competitor's filing. PALM's FY2024 portfolio review of Merdeka Copper Gold lists Saratoga first among MDKA's prominent shareholders, alongside PALM's own holding vehicle PT SAM and PALM's controlling shareholder PT Provident Capital Indonesia. It documents that on Saratoga's single largest listed position the relationship is co-ownership rather than rivalry — the same cap table, entered at different times. PALM's FY2025 report drops the shareholder sentence and describes MDKA without naming its owners.

PT Merdeka Copper Gold Tbk (“MDKA”) is a holding company that oversees various companies in the mining sector, including the production and exploration of gold, silver, nickel, and other minerals. Established in 2012, MDKA became a public company in 2015 with the share code MDKA. MDKA's Shareholders include several prominent Shareholders, such as PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya Tbk, PT PCI (via PT Mitra Daya Mustika), the Company (via PT SAM), and Mr. Garibaldi Thohir.

p. 41 · Read in context →

PT Indika Energy Tbk (INDY)

The Indonesian holding company redeploying coal cash flow into the same energy-transition and minerals assets Saratoga targets — gold, nickel, logistics infrastructure, EV, solar — and the peer that discloses hard capital-allocation numbers for the pivot. Indika is also the clearest read on how long a portfolio rotation of this kind actually takes: its own reports document the non-coal revenue target slipping by three years. Only the investment-holding and diversification discussion is used here; the Kideco mining and energy-services operations are outside the comparison.

Indika's statement of where it intends to put capital. The sector list — minerals, logistics and infrastructure, EV, nature-based solutions, solar, battery storage — is the same hunting ground Saratoga describes as energy transition, infrastructure and digital infrastructure. The Awak Mas figures are the operational anchor: a gold project 47.6% built at the end of 2025 with US$100.1m spent, targeting trial production end-2026. The 50%-by-2028 revenue split is a company target, not a result; the achieved mix is on p.312 of the same report.

Our transition is focused and disciplined—to achieve at least 50% of revenue from non-coal businesses by 2028 while strengthening portfolio resilience. Through Diversification, Decarbonization, and Divestment, we are accelerating toward a lower-carbon future, unlocking new growth and supporting Indonesia's energy security and climate goals as well as achieving its net-zero emissions target by 2050. We are expanding our portfolio by investing in low-carbon and high-growth sectors, including minerals, logistics & infrastructure, electric vehicles, nature-based solutions, solar energy, and battery storage. This supports the development of a more balanced, resilient, and future-oriented business. […] The Awak Mas gold project is currently in the construction phase, with trial production targeted for the end of 2026. As of the end of 2025, construction progress had reached 47.60%, with capital expenditure absorption amounting to US$100.1 million.

p. 26 · Read in context →

The two numbers side by side in Indika's operational review: 95.4% of 2025 capex went to non-coal businesses, yet non-coal was still only 18.0% of revenue, up 2.1 points on the year. This is the arithmetic of a listed Indonesian holding company rotating a portfolio in public — near-total redirection of new capital producing incremental movement in the revenue mix — and it is the closest disclosed benchmark for how quickly a peer's asset base can actually turn over. Revenue mix, not NAV mix; Indika consolidates its coal operations, so the denominator is operating revenue rather than portfolio value.

Of the total capital expenditure of US$139.0 million during 2025, the Company allocated US$132.6 million, or more than 95.4%, to the development of non-coal businesses. One of the key investment focuses is Awak Mas, a gold mining project in Luwu, South Sulawesi, which represents an important part of Indika's expansion into the minerals sector. […] As the transition is still ongoing, the coal business continues to serve as the main pillar of Indika Energy. In 2025, the coal business segment contributed 82.0% of the Company's revenue. Meanwhile, the proportion of non-coal business increased to 18.0%, up from 15.9% in 2024.

p. 312 · Read in context →

From the year-by-year transformation timeline printed at the front of the FY2025 report, which runs newest first — so the 2024 entry (the deferral) is quoted here ahead of the 2023 entry (the original target). Indika set a 50% non-coal revenue goal for 2025, then moved it to 2028. Management's own framing calls the original target 'highly ambitious' and the revision 'strategic adaptation'; the disclosure is unusually direct about a missed target, and it is the peer group's clearest evidence of the lag between announcing a portfolio pivot and delivering one.

As a form of strategic adaptation, the Company realistically adjusted its target of 50% non-coal revenue to 2028. […] In this phase, the Company set a highly ambitious target of achieving 50% of its revenue from non-coal sectors by 2025.

p. 5 · Read in context →

PT Astra International Tbk (ASII)

Indonesia's largest listed diversified group and the best-capitalised domestic bidder for the growth-stage minority stakes Saratoga pursues. Astra is a conglomerate, so only the capital-allocation and new-investment discussion in the FY2025 management reports is used here — the automotive, heavy-equipment and financial-services operations are outside the comparison. What the exhibits show is Astra explicitly targeting healthcare, industrial and logistics infrastructure and natural resources, and taking 20–31% minority positions in exactly the format Saratoga uses.

Astra's board naming its three target areas for new investment: healthcare, industrial and logistics infrastructure, and natural-resource ventures. That list is a near-complete overlap with Saratoga's stated pillars, and it comes from a balance sheet an order of magnitude larger — Rp507tn of total assets at end-2025. 'Significant headroom' is management's characterisation of the opportunity, not a sized market. The same page notes a Strategic Review still in progress, so the 2026 allocation is not yet fixed.

Djony Bunarto Tjondro (President Director) — Report of the Board of Directors: The Group will continue its strategic priorities: strengthening and optimizing its core business, developing businesses that are adjacent to its core business, and investing in new strategic area. The Board of Directors sees significant headroom in healthcare, industrial and logistics infrastructure and potential natural-resource ventures. Future growth will be financed pursuant to a disciplined capital management, strict performance monitoring and a focus on operational efficiency.

p. 51 · Read in context →

The concrete version of the strategy above, and the exhibit that most directly prices the competition for assets. Astra discloses Rp8.6tn committed to healthcare across a listed hospital operator (Hermina, 20.2%), a digital health platform (Halodoc, 31.3%) and a specialist hospital, built up over four years. These are non-controlling stakes in Indonesian growth companies — the same instrument and the same sector Saratoga has used — funded from a group that generated Rp40.2tn of profit in 2025. Astra does not disclose the entry valuations or the mark on these positions.

Djony Bunarto Tjondro (President Director) — Report of the Board of Directors: The Group increased its ownership in Halodoc to 31.3% and PT Medikaloka Hermina Tbk (Hermina) to 20.2%. As of the end of 2025, the Group's total investment in the healthcare sector, including Hermina, Halodoc and Heartology Hospital, amounts to Rp8.6 trillion. These transactions build on the Group's initial investments in Halodoc in 2021 and Hermina in 2022, reflecting a long-term commitment to developing a healthcare ecosystem.

p. 48 · Read in context →

Astra's six-year retrospective on how it invests, which separates two different activities that a diversified group can run at once: adjacency deals inside its existing franchises (used cars, financing, digital banking) and 'selective investments' in genuinely new sectors, healthcare and mineral mines. Only the second category competes with Saratoga for assets. The distinction matters for judging how much of Astra's capacity is actually pointed at the same deals — the adjacency spending is core-business capex that would happen regardless.

Djony Bunarto Tjondro (President Director) — Report of the Board of Directors: Throughout this period, Astra continued to pursue opportunities in strategic investments in sectors with strong long-term growth potential. The Group has expanded into adjacent areas naturally connected to its core capabilities, such as increasing its investments in used car segment and broadening product offerings beyond traditional automotive financing (e.g. multipurpose financing, digital banking). The Group has also pursued new growth opportunities through selective investments in sectors such as healthcare and mineral mines.

p. 45 · Read in context →

PT Indoritel Makmur Internasional Tbk (DNET)

Listed alongside Saratoga in the IDX 'Perusahaan Investasi' grouping and running the same structural model: a small holding company whose reported earnings are equity income from long-held non-controlling stakes in Indonesian consumer champions, valued by the market on portfolio value rather than operating profit. Its one consolidated asset, the fibre network FiberStar, puts it directly in Saratoga's digital-infrastructure pillar, and its disclosures give a rare like-for-like read on the operating scale behind an Indonesian holdco's digital-infrastructure position.

DNET's entire portfolio in one sentence: one consolidated fibre subsidiary plus three associate stakes in Indonesian consumer businesses — the Indomaret convenience chain, KFC Indonesia and Sari Roti. It is the structural template Saratoga uses — a handful of concentrated, long-held minority positions in domestic champions — applied to consumer rather than resources and infrastructure. The disclosure gives no ownership percentages or carrying values; those sit in the financial statements.

Currently, the Company's core business focuses on investments through its ownership in the subsidiary PT Mega Akses Persada (“FiberStar”), supported by the performance of three associates, PT Indomarco Prismatama (“Indomaret”), PT Fast Food Indonesia Tbk (“FAST”), and PT Nippon Indosari Corpindo Tbk (“ROTI”).

p. 9 · Read in context →

The operating scale behind DNET's digital-infrastructure position: 483,455 customers, 63,758 km of fibre, 17 provinces, and subsea capacity reaching Singapore. This is the asset a rival Indonesian holding company has built in the same infrastructure category Saratoga lists among its pillars, and the customer and route-kilometre counts are the concrete yardstick for comparison. All figures are FiberStar's own disclosures via its parent; the 'national resilience' framing is the company's.

As of 2025, FiberStar has served 483,455 customers, supported by a fiber optic cable network spanning 63,758 km, delivering high-speed internet services with strong reliability. Currently, FiberStar services cover 17 provinces, including undersea cable networks connecting 145 cities/districts in Sumatra, Java, Bali, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi to Singapore. This terrestrial and submarine infrastructure is expected to strengthen national resilience, particularly in the development of Indonesia's digital economy.

p. 78 · Read in context →

DNET stating the analytical problem that all listed Indonesian holding companies share, Saratoga included: reported earnings are an accounting composite of one consolidated subsidiary and equity-method income from associates, so headline profit tracks the operating performance of whichever asset is consolidated rather than the value of the portfolio. Useful as the peer-set articulation of why these companies are read on portfolio value rather than reported earnings — DNET does not itself publish a net asset value.

As an investment company, the Company's financial performance is highly dependent on the performance of FiberStar as its subsidiary, which contributes revenue from customer contracts, as well as the performance of its three associates, which contribute to the Company's share of profit from associates and joint ventures. Accordingly, the achievement of the Company's financial performance is closely correlated with the operational performance of FiberStar.

p. 102 · Read in context →

PT Multipolar Tbk (MLPL)

The Lippo group's listed investment holding vehicle, competing for the same pool of investors who allocate to Indonesian holdco equity and, on the technology side, for the same growth-stage digital assets. Included mainly as a contrast case: MLPL states the same disciplined-capital-allocation doctrine as its larger peers while operating at roughly a twentieth of Astra's asset base and reporting a loss for 2025 — a reminder that the listed-holdco format in Indonesia spans very different underwriting outcomes.

MLPL's investment criteria followed immediately by its 2025 result, in the company's own sequence. The stated focus — healthtech, data and AI platforms, cloud, digital retail integration — is where MLPL says new money goes. The financial paragraph sets the scale: Rp15.1tn of assets, Rp6.3tn of equity, gearing of 0.3x, and a loss attributable to owners of Rp156.4bn. The 'remain solid' and 'solid operational performance' framing is management's; the loss line is disclosed in the same breath, so the exhibit carries both.

Adrian Suherman (President Director) — Report from the President Director: Furthermore, the Board of Directors directs the investment and divestment process based on an assessment of business feasibility, growth potential, and contribution to the overall portfolio strategy. The focus is on high-value initiatives such as healthcare technology, data and AI platforms, cloud solutions, and digital integration opportunities in the retail and consumer services industries. […] On a consolidated basis, the Company's financial fundamentals remain solid. Total assets increased to Rp15.1 trillion or increased 14.9%, driven by growth in current assets and optimization of the investment portfolio. Total equity also increased 29.5% to Rp6.3 trillion, reflecting its commitment to a sound financial foundation. Financial discipline is evident in the Debt-to-Equity Ratio of 0.3x and consolidated bank loans, which were successfully reduced to Rp2.0 trillion by year-end. Operational performance improved, with consolidated Net Sales growing 1.3% to Rp11.5 trillion. The Company also recorded gross profit of Rp1.9 trillion, reflecting solid operational performance, while loss attributable to owners of the parent entity amounted to Rp156.4 billion.

p. 31 · Read in context →

MLPL's claim to regional standing, from the corporate-history section: a repositioning in 2021 as 'a leading technology investment company in Southeast Asia' with a mandate to back local and regional startups. It is an unquantified self-assessment — no portfolio value, deal count or ranking is attached — but it marks where MLPL says it wants to compete, and the early-stage regional tilt is the one place in this peer set that differs from Saratoga's later-stage domestic approach.

At the end of 2021, the Company transformed into MPC to enhance its commitment to supporting and accelerating digital economic growth in Indonesia, thereby solidifying its position as a leading technology investment company in Southeast Asia. This transformation emphasizes the commitment to embrace more local and regional startups, in line with the vision to become a leading investment company and contribute positively to society.

p. 41 · Read in context →

More peer documents

PT Indika Energy Tbk — FY2024 Annual Report — FY2024 · 616 pages · The prior-year baseline for the non-coal mix (15.9%) and the earlier framing of the same five business pillars — useful for testing whether the 2025 language marks a real change of pace or a restatement. · Open →

PT Astra International Tbk — FY2024 Annual Report — FY2024 · 532 pages · The prior-year management reports, for dating when healthcare and mineral mines first entered Astra's stated priority list and at what carrying value the Halodoc and Hermina stakes stood before the 2025 top-ups. · Open →

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Source: S&P Capital IQ consensus via Xpressfeed · Generated 2026-07-28.

Coverage caution: one analyst stands behind every forward line

Every metric that reports an analyst count shows n=1, and every high-low range is zero-width with a standard deviation of 0. Only six metrics are covered — EPS, normalized net income, EBITDA, EBIT, ROE and DPS — with no revenue, FCF, capex, net debt or cash-flow estimates and no quarterly periods. Read this as one broker's model rather than a consensus.

FY27 EPS consensus jumped from IDR 36.30 to IDR 194.53 between the 90-day and 30-day marks

Currency: IDR · Scale: money in billions, absolute · Point-in-time consensus; Δ90d is Now versus 90d.

Metric	FY	180d	90d	30d	Now	Δ90d
EPS (normalized)	FY2027	IDR 36.30	IDR 36.30	IDR 194.5	IDR 194.5	+435.9%
EPS (normalized)	FY2028	—	—	IDR 205.0	IDR 205.0	—

FY2025 normalized EPS printed at 538 against the 66.31 estimate on file

The same year's EBITDA actual of 6,788.809 sits against a consensus of -256.103. There is no quarterly beat/miss record for Saratoga, so this single annual pairing is the only calibration available for how closely the modelled framework tracks reported results.

Net income, EPS and ROE all rise through FY28 while EBIT and EBITDA stay negative every year

Normalized net income runs 2,008.03 then 2,634.08 then 2,775.04 across the three years, so the growth rate falls off sharply after FY2027. Dividend per share is the one non-monotonic line, at IDR 103.50 in FY2026, IDR 77.39 in FY2027 and IDR 91.58 in FY2028.

Currency: IDR · Scale: money in billions, absolute · YoY uses the prior fiscal year from the feed; analyst count and range use the first displayed period.

Metric	FY2026E	FY2027E	FY2028E	YoY	Analysts	Low / high
EPS (normalized)	IDR 148.3	IDR 194.5	IDR 205.0	-72.4%	1	IDR 148.3 / IDR 148.3
Net income (normalized)	IDR 2,008	IDR 2,634	IDR 2,775	+123.6%	—	—
EBITDA	-IDR 251.9	-IDR 274.3	-IDR 298.9	-103.7%	1	-IDR 251.9 / -IDR 251.9
EBIT	-IDR 255.5	-IDR 278.0	-IDR 302.6	+0.7%	—	—
ROE	3.4%	4.4%	4.5%	+1.7pt	—	—
Dividend per share	IDR 103.5	IDR 77.39	IDR 91.58	+229.2%	—	—

A single target price of IDR 2,850, and both recommendations on file are buy or outperform

The consensus recommendation score is 1.5, from one buy and one outperform, with no holds, sells or no-opinion. Mean, median, high and low target are all IDR 2,850 because a single estimate underlies each of them.

Currency: IDR · Scale: money in billions, absolute · Analyst counts shown explicitly.

Street view	Reading	Analysts
Recommendation mix	Buy 1, Outperform 1, Hold 0, Underperform 0, Sell 0	2
Consensus score	1.50	2
Target price	mean IDR 2,850; median IDR 2,850; high IDR 2,850; low IDR 2,850	1

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What Saratoga is

PT Saratoga Investama Sedaya is a Jakarta holding company that owns minority and controlling stakes in a concentrated set of Indonesian businesses and reports its own worth as the market value of those stakes less net debt. At the end of 2025 that figure was Rp60,284 billion, or Rp4,444 per share [1]. The shares closed at Rp1,760 on 27 July 2026 [2]. The distance between those two numbers is what this report is about.

Saratoga describes itself as an active investment company, founded in 1997 and listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange under the code SRTG [3]. It came to market on 26 June 2013 at Rp5,500 a share, split the stock five-for-one in May 2021, and has had 13,564,835,000 shares outstanding since [4]. That IPO price is Rp1,100 in today's shares, so thirteen years of listed life have produced a 60% price gain plus modest dividends. It employs 67 people [5]. There is no operating business at the holding company: it buys stakes, sits on boards, collects dividends and occasionally sells. Its own annual report says plainly that marketing is a matter for the investee companies, not the parent [6].

The company publishes its net asset value on a fixed arithmetic each year: the sum of investee company values, minus debt, plus cash [7]. For 2025 that was Rp60,768 billion of investee value, less Rp1,451 billion of debt, plus Rp967 billion of cash, giving Rp60,284 billion — up 12% on 2024's Rp53,985 billion [8].

Sources: NAV per share from the FY2025 Annual Report NAV bridge [9]; closing price of Rp1,760 on 27 July 2026 [10]; market cap and discount derived from that price and the 13,564,835,000 shares outstanding [11].

What it owns

Four listed holdings account for three-quarters of the portfolio. Tower Bersama, a telecom tower operator with more than 24,300 sites, is the largest position at 30.7% of portfolio value [12]. Merdeka Copper Gold is a gold, copper and nickel producer; Alamtri Resources and Adaro Andalan are the two halves of the former Adaro coal group, separated in late 2024 into a minerals-and-renewables company and a standalone thermal coal producer [13].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Net Asset Valuation as of 31 December 2025 and 2024; portfolio shares derived from the same table [14].

Two things about that table matter for everything downstream. The first is concentration: TBIG, MDKA, ADRO and AADI together are Rp46,484 billion, or 76.5% of investee value. The second is what sits underneath the four names — towers, gold and copper, metallurgical coal and minerals, thermal coal. Roughly 46% of the portfolio is priced off commodities, and coal in particular still funds much of the cash that reaches Jakarta.

The rest is a mix of a majority-owned automotive group (Mitra Pinasthika Mustika, 57.7%), industrial gas, construction, and a set of private businesses the company has been scaling: Brawijaya Healthcare, six hospitals and a clinic, which opened Brawijaya Taman Mini in 2025 [15]; ZAP, 118 aesthetic clinics [16]; the solar developer Xurya [17]; and the data-centre platform Digital Realty Bersama [18].

Where the money comes from

Saratoga's income statement is two very different things stapled together, and a reader who treats reported profit as earnings will be badly misled.

Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss for 2025 and 2024 [19]; FY2023 Annual Report for 2023 and 2022 [20]; FY2022 Annual Report for 2021 [21].

The blue bars are unrealised revaluation of the stakes. They swing from a Rp24,408 billion gain in 2021 to a Rp13,811 billion loss in 2023 and back to a Rp4,140 billion gain in 2025 [22][23]. They are a restatement of the same NAV that appears on the balance sheet, not income in any cash sense. Reported profit follows them: a Rp10,151 billion loss in 2023, a Rp3,291 billion profit in 2024, a Rp7,322 billion profit in 2025 [24]. Earnings per share ran from minus Rp750 to Rp243 to Rp540 over the same three years [25]. Any multiple built on those numbers is arithmetic performed on a price index.

The orange bars are the cash business, and it is small, steady and legible. Dividend income was Rp2,784 billion in 2023, Rp3,786 billion in 2024 and Rp2,705 billion in 2025, of which ADRO and AADI supplied Rp2,149 billion in 2025, TBIG Rp225 billion and MPMX Rp304 billion [26]. Against that, the whole holding company costs Rp233 billion a year to run and Rp165 billion to finance [27]. Operating cost is 0.4% of NAV [28]. On a fee-comparison basis that is cheap for a managed pool of assets, and the cost line has barely moved in three years while NAV rose 23%.

The dependence on coal dividends is the obvious fragility. In 2025 the two Adaro entities were 79% of dividends received, and dividend income fell 29% year on year as thermal coal prices normalised, even as NAV rose 12% [29].

What shareholders have received

For three years Saratoga kept almost all of the cash it collected. That changed with the 2025 distribution.

Sources: dividends income by investee, FY2025 Annual Report [30]; distributions for FY2023 and FY2024, FY2025 Annual Report dividend table [31]; FY2025 distribution derived from the Rp103.3 per share reported paid on 12 June 2026 and shares outstanding [32].

The distributions for FY2023 and FY2024 were Rp22 and Rp14.75 a share, Rp297.8 billion and Rp199.9 billion in total — 11% and 5% of the dividends the company itself had received [33]. For FY2025 the board deferred the amount to the general meeting of 18 May 2026 [34], and Indonesian financial press reported a payment of Rp103.3 per share on 12 June 2026 [35]. That is roughly Rp1,401 billion, seven times the prior year and about half the dividends received. At Rp1,760 it is a 5.9% yield. The corpus contains no company document stating the FY2025 per-share amount, so that figure rests on press reporting rather than a filing — worth confirming against the eventual FY2026 annual report.

Price against value

The company's NAV per share has been roughly flat for three years while the share price has not.

Sources: NAV per share from each year's Net Asset Valuation table — FY2022 Annual Report for 2021 and 2022 [36], FY2023 Annual Report for 2023 [37], FY2024 Annual Report for 2024 [38], FY2025 Annual Report for 2025 [39]; year-end closing prices from the FY2022 Annual Report [40], FY2023 Annual Report [41] and the FY2025 Annual Report quarterly closing price table [42].

NAV per share was Rp4,492 at the end of 2022 and Rp4,444 at the end of 2025 — down 1% across three years, having fallen 20% in 2023 and recovered since [43][44]. The share price over the same window went from Rp2,530 to Rp1,580, and the intraday high of Rp3,850 set in the second quarter of 2022 is 54% above the July 2026 price [45][46]. The discount to published NAV widened from 33% at the end of 2021 to 64% at the end of 2025, with a partial narrowing in 2024.

At Rp1,760 the market values the whole company at about Rp23.9 trillion. The TBIG and MDKA stakes alone were marked at Rp29,469 billion on 31 December 2025 [47]. On those marks the market capitalisation is 19% below the value of two holdings, with ADRO, AADI, MPMX, the industrial gas and construction stakes, the hospitals, the clinics, the solar platform and the data centres carried at less than nothing. The comparison mixes a July 2026 price with December 2025 marks, and the underlying stakes have moved since — the first-quarter 2026 statement shows investments in shares up 12% to Rp63,326 billion [48]. Applying the company's own NAV arithmetic to that statement gives roughly Rp67.8 trillion, near Rp5,000 a share, and a discount closer to 65%.

Who owns it

Three parties hold 89% of the shares. Edwin Soeryadjaya, the president commissioner and co-founder, held 35.87% directly at the end of 2025; PT Unitras Pertama held 31.62%; Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno, the other co-founder, held 21.51%. The public float — every holder below 5%, some 22,383 of them — is 10.995% [49]. The three executive directors hold a further 0.15% between them, and each added shares during 2025 [50]; all three bought again on 1 July 2026 at Rp1,560 under the long-term incentive programme [51].

Concentration of that degree cuts both ways and the report should hold both edges. Owners with 89% of the equity bear the discount alongside the minority, which is the strongest structural argument that management's incentives point at NAV per share rather than at size. The same 89% leaves an 11% float in a market where average daily volume ran at 6 to 13 million shares a quarter through 2025 [52] — roughly Rp10 billion to Rp20 billion a day at current prices. An institution cannot build a position of any size, and the discount is partly the price of that fact. Coverage is correspondingly thin: two brokers, one published earnings estimate, and no revenue consensus at all [53]. The company holds no earnings calls; the corpus contains no transcript for any period, because none exists.

How solid the balance sheet is

For an investor whose first question about a leveraged-looking holding company is whether it can go bankrupt, the answer here is unusually clean. Borrowings were Rp1,450 billion at the end of 2025 against Rp966 billion of cash, giving net debt of Rp484 billion and a loan-to-value ratio of 0.8%, down from 3.0% a year earlier [54]. Total liabilities of Rp3,592 billion sit against Rp62,511 billion of assets, and Rp2,054 billion of those liabilities are deferred tax rather than anything payable to a lender [55][56]. The loan maturity ladder runs Rp251 billion in 2026 and Rp763 billion as late as 2029, against annual dividend receipts of Rp2.5 trillion to Rp4.2 trillion [57][58]. By the end of March 2026 borrowings had fallen further to Rp796 billion against Rp1,027 billion of cash and time deposits — a net cash position [59].

The financing risk in this structure is not the holding company's own leverage. It is whatever debt sits inside the investees, which does not appear on this balance sheet at all — a question the report should take up separately.

How much of the NAV is checkable

The NAV is only as good as the marks behind it, and the marks are not uniform. Of Rp56,742 billion of investments in shares at the end of 2025, Rp26,113 billion was Level 1 — quoted prices in active markets — Rp25,486 billion Level 2 and Rp5,144 billion Level 3 [60].

That looks worse than it is, and the auditor's own language explains why. KPMG's Indonesian member firm flagged the valuation of Level 2 and 3 investments as a key audit matter, noting they totalled Rp34,544 billion, or 55.26% of consolidated assets — but also that Rp25,486 billion of the Level 2 balance consists of investments in entities that hold a direct ownership in publicly traded shares [61]. Those are intermediate holding vehicles whose underlying assets carry observable prices. Netting them out, about Rp51.6 trillion of the Rp60.8 trillion portfolio — roughly 85% — traces to listed quotes either directly or one level down, and about Rp9.1 trillion, some 15%, rests on discounted cash flow, comparable-company multiples or recent acquisition cost [62][63]. The auditor is explicit that the remainder is inherently subjective, uses unobservable inputs, and that holding investments through other investing entities further limits price transparency [64].

Two adjustments are worth making before treating that NAV as a target. The published NAV takes no deduction for the Rp2,054 billion deferred tax liability that would crystallise on realising the gains; charging it in full takes NAV per share from Rp4,444 to about Rp4,293 and the discount from 60% to 59% [65]. And the marks are last traded prices applied to stakes of 15% to 32%; the exit price for a block of that size is not the screen price. Neither adjustment comes close to accounting for a 60% gap.

The question this report is built to answer

Saratoga is a founder-controlled Indonesian holding company whose shares trade around 60% below the market value of the stakes it owns, and this report exists to establish whether that gap is a permanent feature of an 89%-held, commodity-weighted portfolio, or a discount that the company's own cash flows, disclosure and record of monetising assets can narrow.

The evidence assembled here points to a real asset base rather than an accounting one: 85% of the portfolio is anchored to observable listed prices, the holding company runs on 0.4% of NAV a year, net debt is effectively zero, and management owns 89% of what is being discounted. The strongest fact on the other side is that the discount has widened, not narrowed, in three of the last four years while all of those conditions already held — which says the market is pricing something the balance sheet does not capture, whether that is float, governance, the coal concentration in the dividend stream, or simply the absence of a mechanism that converts NAV into cash for a minority holder. The FY2025 distribution of roughly half of dividends received, if repeated, is the first evidence in three years of such a mechanism. A second year at that payout, or a large realisation returned to shareholders, would change the read; a reversion to a 5% payout would confirm the bearish one.

What this chapter does not settle

Forward estimates are outside what the filings support: two brokers cover the stock, one publishes an earnings number, and no revenue consensus exists [66]. For a company whose reported earnings are a mark-to-market artefact, a consensus EPS is close to meaningless in any case; the forward question is dividends and NAV growth, and it needs its own treatment. The debt and prospects of the investee companies, the quality of governance around related-party dealings, management's compensation, and the track record of actual exits — each is a chapter's worth of evidence, and none is settled by what is above.

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The cash that actually arrives

Saratoga's reported earnings are almost entirely fair-value marks. The cash that reaches the holding company is dividends from investees, and in 2025 that stream, net of every holding-company cost, came to Rp2,294 billion — 9.6% of the Rp23,874 billion market capitalisation. Four-fifths of it came from two coal companies that together are 28% of the portfolio's value. This chapter separates the two flows and sets out what the single covering forecast says.

The audited cash flow statement is the cleanest window into the business. It shows six line items that recur every year — dividends collected, interest collected, interest paid, staff paid, tax paid, other operating payments — and two that are discretionary: proceeds from selling investments, and cash deployed into new ones. Stripping the discretionary items out gives a recurring cash result that ties exactly to the reported operating cash flow.

Source: audited consolidated statements of cash flows, years ended 31 December 2025 and 2024 [1]; subtotals derived.

Rp2,294 billion of recurring cash income in 2025 is Rp169 per share against the 27 July 2026 close of Rp1,760 — a 9.6% cash yield on the market price, and 3.8% on the Rp60,284 billion net asset value the company publishes [2]. On the 2024 base of Rp3,959 billion the same arithmetic gives Rp292 per share and 16.6%. The two years bracket the range, and the difference between them is almost entirely one variable: how much coal paid out.

The holding company's own cost base barely moves. Staff payments ran Rp117 billion in 2024 and Rp118 billion in 2025 [3]; accrual operating expenses were Rp233 billion against an internal target of Rp267 billion, or 0.39% of net asset value [4]. Interest paid was Rp177 billion in 2025 and will fall: borrowings were Rp1,450 billion at year-end and Rp796 billion at 31 March 2026, against Rp871 billion of cash and Rp156 billion of time deposits [5].

Across five years the gross flows tell the same story with more amplitude.

Sources: FY2021 Annual Report, Consolidated Statements of Cash Flow [6]; FY2022 [7]; FY2023 [8]; FY2024 [9]; FY2025 [10].

2022 is the outlier that matters for calibration: Rp20,200 billion of disposal proceeds and Rp18,290 billion redeployed in the same year [11]. Much of that was a restructuring of the Tower Bersama holding, in which shares were sold to Bersama Digital Infrastructure Asia while a group company subscribed for Bersama Digital shares, taking effective ownership of Tower Bersama from 34.23% to 31.26% [12]. Gross proceeds at this company are not evidence of monetisation on their own; the redeployment line has to be read alongside them.

Reported profit is a mark, not a receipt

The income statement runs on a different engine. Over five years the fair-value line swings from a Rp24,408 billion gain to a Rp13,811 billion loss and back to a Rp4,140 billion gain, while dividend and interest income never leaves a band of Rp1,656 billion to Rp3,849 billion.

Sources (Rp billion): FY2022 Annual Report, Review of Operations [13]; FY2023 [14]; FY2024 [15]; FY2025 [16].

The tax line moves with the marks too. Deferred tax was a Rp1,615 billion charge in 2024 and a Rp749 billion credit in 2025 [17], against cash income tax actually paid of Rp5 billion and Rp26 billion [18]. Three lines of the profit and loss account — the fair-value gain, the deferred tax, and therefore the bottom line — are opinions about prices rather than transactions.

The first quarter of 2026 is the cleanest single illustration. Reported profit was Rp5,321 billion, or Rp393 per share, on a Rp6,911 billion fair-value gain and a Rp1,500 billion deferred tax charge; dividend and interest income recognised in the quarter was Rp6 billion [19]. The cash statement for the same three months shows Rp705 billion of dividends actually collected and Rp97 billion deployed [20]; the related-party receivable fell from Rp731 billion to Rp27 billion over the quarter [21], a balance the company attributes largely to dividends receivable from Alamtri Resources [22]. Dividend income is recognised on declaration, and declarations cluster in the second and third quarters, so a single quarter's income statement says almost nothing about the year's cash.

Sources: profit from the Review of Operations tables, FY2022 and FY2025 Annual Reports [23], [24]; cash dividend receipts from the cash flow discussions [25], [26].

Where the value sits and where the income comes from

The dividend income breakdown is disclosed by investee every year, and for anyone holding the shares for the cash it is the most consequential table in the annual report.

Sources: dividend income breakdown tables, FY2022 Annual Report [27], FY2024 [28], FY2025 [29]; coal is Adaro Energy Indonesia, renamed Alamtri Resources Indonesia, plus Adaro Andalan Indonesia from 2025.

Coal's share of dividend income has been 67%, 74%, 77%, 82% and 79% in the five years to 2025 [30], [31], [32]. It has never been below two-thirds. The 2025 fall in total dividend income, from Rp3,786 billion to Rp2,705 billion, was Alamtri cutting from Rp3,121 billion to Rp1,515 billion, partly offset by Rp634 billion of first-time dividends from Adaro Andalan after the thermal coal separation [33].

Set that against where the portfolio value actually sits at 31 December 2025.

Source: derived from the net asset valuation table and the dividend income breakdown, FY2025 Annual Report [34], [35].

The two largest holdings by value — Tower Bersama at Rp18,663 billion and Merdeka Copper Gold at Rp10,806 billion, together 48% of the Rp60,768 billion portfolio [36] — supplied 8% of dividend income between them, Merdeka none at all [37]. The two coal companies, 28% of value, supplied 79%. The discount is a claim on towers and copper; the yield is a claim on coal. One share certificate delivers both, but they are not the same asset and they will not decline or recover together.

That divergence also explains why the mark and the cash moved in opposite directions in 2025. Tower Bersama and Merdeka added Rp3,399 billion and Rp3,284 billion of fair-value gains while Alamtri and Adaro Andalan subtracted Rp4,600 billion [38] — net asset value per share rose 12% to Rp4,444 [39] in the same year cash dividend receipts fell 41% [40].

Debt first, dividend last

What Saratoga does with the cash has followed a consistent order of priority, and the dividend has come last in it. The record of distributions, by the year each was paid:

Sources: dividend tables, FY2022 Annual Report [41], FY2023 [42], FY2025 [43]; the 2026 amount from Indonesian press coverage of the May 2026 general meeting [44]. The 2021 payment of Rp110 per share is shown adjusted for the five-for-one split.

The Rp103.3 paid in June 2026 is the largest per-share amount in the company's listed history, but it is the second time in four years the company has distributed roughly Rp1 trillion: Rp1,017 billion, or Rp75 per share, went out in June 2023 [45]. What followed is the more instructive part: distributions fell to Rp298 billion and then Rp199.9 billion [46] across 2024 and 2025 — the two years in which the company deployed Rp5,772 billion into new investments [47] and drew Rp3,533 billion of bank loans to help fund it [48]. In 2025 the priority reversed: Rp4,686 billion of loans were repaid against Rp2,931 billion drawn and deployment halved [49], leaving borrowings at Rp1,450 billion and loan-to-value at 0.8% [50]. The large dividend arrived only once the balance sheet was clean.

There is no formula behind any of this, and the company says so. Its stated policy is that dividends require sufficient profit or positive retained earnings and are subject to the board's recommendation and shareholder approval, with no payout ratio specified [51]. The meeting that approved the 2026 payment framed it as 19.13% of FY2025 net profit of Rp7.32 trillion [52] — a percentage of a number that was itself 57% fair-value gain on investments [53]. The same ratio applied to the 2023 loss year would have produced nothing.

My read is that the dividend at Saratoga is a residual rather than a claim: it is what remains after management has decided how much to invest and how much debt to carry, and those two decisions come first. The strongest fact against that reading is the 2026 sequence itself — the payment was raised sevenfold in a year when dividend receipts fell 41%, which is a deliberate step up rather than residual behaviour. A second year would settle it: a payment near Rp100 per share for FY2026 alongside continued deployment would establish a policy where none is written down.

Forward estimates, and how thin they are

Management publishes no forward financial guidance. The FY2025 annual report states that as an investment holding company it does not set quantitative targets for investment deployment, realised gains or net profit, and the section headed "Target for 2026" says the company sets formal annual targets only for operating expenses [54], [55]. There are no earnings calls and no transcripts in any period, so there is no management commentary to model against either.

That leaves a single sell-side model. The figures below are the consensus as compiled for this report, with one contributing estimate on earnings and dividends.

Source: consensus estimates as compiled for this report; one contributing analyst on earnings and dividends. The 2025 row is the estimate, not the reported outcome.

Two things are worth extracting from it, and one warning.

The model strips fair value out entirely. Its forecast operating result is roughly minus Rp250 billion to minus Rp300 billion a year — the holding company's cost base and nothing else — with dividends carried below that line. The widely quoted "EPS growth" figures for Saratoga therefore compare a normalised forecast against a mark-inclusive actual: the 2025 estimate of Rp66.3 sits against reported basic earnings of Rp540 per share [56], and the resulting "decline" for 2026 is an artefact of the two bases, not a forecast of deterioration.

On its own terms, the model puts normalised earnings at Rp148.3 per share for 2026 and Rp194.5 for 2027. At Rp1,760 that is 11.9 times 2026 and 9.0 times 2027. The dividend line reads Rp103.5 for 2026 — within rounding of the Rp103.3 already paid in June — then Rp77.4 for 2027, a 25% reduction. Whether that reflects a view on sustainability or simply a payment-year convention cannot be determined from the data available; either way, the one house modelling this stock does not carry Rp103 forward as a run rate. The mean twelve-month price target is Rp2,850, and one covering broker cut its target to Rp2,600 from Rp3,000 in July 2025.

The warning is reconciliation. The model's 2025 normalised net income of Rp898 billion is well below the Rp2,294 billion of recurring cash the audited cash flow statement shows [57]. Whatever normalisation produces that gap is not disclosed, and with a single contributor there is no second model to triangulate against. These estimates are one house's view and should be read as such rather than as a market consensus.

The more useful forward number comes from management by way of the press: a target of US$100–150 million of new investment a year, in healthcare, renewables, digital infrastructure and consumer [58]. At the year-end 2025 rate of Rp16,782 to the dollar [59] that is Rp1,678 billion to Rp2,517 billion. Placed against the FY2025 recurring cash base of Rp2,294 billion, the deployment target alone absorbs 73% to 110% of it, and the Rp1,401 billion dividend absorbs a further 61%. Together they claim 134% to 171% of recurring cash income.

That is not a solvency observation. With Rp796 billion of borrowings against Rp1,027 billion of cash and deposits at 31 March 2026 [60] and a Rp60 trillion portfolio behind it, the company has ample capacity to borrow or sell. It is an observation about which of the three uses gets cut when coal dividends fall, and the 2024 and 2025 record answers it: the dividend did.

What would change the read

Three developments would move this analysis materially, and each is observable within a year. Alamtri and Adaro Andalan declaring 2026 dividends at or above 2025 levels would confirm the cash base at roughly Rp2.3 trillion; the sensitivity is straightforward, since every Rp500 billion of lost coal dividends is 22% of that base and Rp37 per share. Tower Bersama or Merdeka Copper Gold initiating a meaningful distribution would begin to close the gap between where the value sits and where the income comes from, and would be the most valuable single change to the cash profile. And a written payout policy — a stated share of dividends received rather than a percentage of a mark-to-market profit — would convert the largest per-share dividend in the company's history from an event into a claim, which is the difference between a 5.9% yield that can be underwritten and one that cannot.

Web research was unavailable throughout this run, so no broker note, investee dividend announcement or post-March-2026 disclosure could be checked beyond what the corpus and the compiled estimate data contain. The composition of the portfolio itself is treated in Portfolio and Discount; what this chapter adds is that the cash and the value inside it are carried by different assets.

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What sits under the net asset value

Saratoga's net asset value is, in practice, four positions: a tower operator, a copper-gold-nickel miner, the two halves of the former Adaro coal group, and a motorcycle distributor. Their combined mark was Rp48,926 billion at the end of 2025 against Rp53,000 billion four years earlier, while everything else in the portfolio grew from Rp6,799 billion to Rp11,842 billion. A 10% move in those share prices changes reported equity by Rp4,617 billion in the audited accounts.

The four are held in different ways, and only one of them is held directly in full. Merdeka Copper Gold is a straight 19.37% registered holding. Tower Bersama is 31.61%, of which only 9.37% is held through a wholly-owned subsidiary — the remaining 22.25% comes through Bersama Digital Infrastructure Asia, a Singapore company in which Saratoga holds 27.38% and which also owns assets other than towers [1]. The coal exposure is spread across four line items: 4.00% of Alamtri held directly, 4.38% of Adaro Andalan held directly, and 25.00% and 29.79% stakes in two associates, Adaro Strategic Capital and Adaro Strategic Lestari, whose fair value the notes describe as "mainly" representing indirect interests in the same two coal companies [2]. Mitra Pinasthika Mustika is 57.7% owned and still carried at its quoted price rather than consolidated [3].

Sources: valuations and effective ownership from the FY2025 Annual Report net asset valuation table [4]; business descriptions from the 2025 Portfolio Highlights [5], [6], [7], with Mitra Pinasthika Mustika's Honda distribution rights and JACCS MPM Finance stake from the FY2022 Annual Report [8].

Operationally, these are unlike each other in almost every respect that matters. Tower Bersama sells space on more than 24,300 telecommunication sites and distributed antenna networks under long-term contracts [9]; at the end of 2024 it carried over 42,000 tenants across nearly 24,000 sites [10]. Merdeka's economics are set at the mine gate: in 2024 the Tujuh Bukit gold mine produced 115,867 ounces at an all-in sustaining cost of USD1,337 per ounce against an average selling price of USD2,371, Wetar produced 13,902 tonnes of copper, and Merdeka Battery Materials produced 82,161 tonnes of nickel pig iron and 50,315 tonnes of high-grade nickel matte [11]. Alamtri's forward case rests on a smelter: ADMR's aluminium plant was scheduled to begin operating in December 2025 at 500,000 tonnes a year, with planned expansion to 1.5 million tonnes [12]. Adaro Andalan is the thermal coal half of the old group, described by Saratoga as navigating "a normalizing global pricing environment" by growing volumes [13]. A contracted lease book, a mine, a smelter project and a coal seam do not respond to the same variables, and the record of the last five years shows it.

Four years of marks that ended where they started

Saratoga publishes each holding's mark every year, so the trajectory is checkable rather than inferred.

Source: net asset valuation tables in the FY2021 [14], FY2022 [15], FY2023 [16], FY2024 [17] and FY2025 [18] Annual Reports; coal is Adaro Energy Indonesia, renamed Alamtri Resources, plus Adaro Andalan from 2024.

Added together, the four were worth Rp53,000 billion at the end of 2021 and Rp48,926 billion at the end of 2025 — 7.7% lower after four years. Tower Bersama was marked at Rp18,663 billion against Rp22,879 billion; Merdeka at Rp10,806 billion against Rp16,299 billion; the coal holdings, taken together across the 2024 separation, at Rp17,015 billion against Rp10,925 billion. The rest of the portfolio moved the other way, from Rp6,799 billion to Rp11,842 billion. But that increase is largely bought rather than compounded: Saratoga deployed Rp2,152 billion of cash into investments in 2023 [19] and Rp5,772 billion and Rp2,765 billion in 2024 and 2025 [20] — Rp10,689 billion in three years, part of which went into the four core names as well. Neither number is a return.

Two of the moves need qualifying rather than reading straight. Tower Bersama's 2022 fall from Rp22,879 billion to Rp14,318 billion is roughly half price and half structure: the share price went from Rp2,950 to Rp2,300, but effective ownership also dropped from 34.2% to 26.7% in the Bersama Digital restructuring, before recovering to 31.5% in 2023 [21], [22]. And the 2024 jump in the coal line reflects the separation of Adaro Andalan from Alamtri, not a doubling of the underlying business.

The choice of starting year does most of the work in any judgment here, and it should be stated rather than buried. Measured from the end of 2020, the same portfolio went from Rp34,507 billion to Rp60,768 billion, and net asset value per share from Rp2,337 to Rp4,444 [23]. Measured from the end of 2021, after the commodity surge had already been captured, net asset value per share rose from Rp4,152 to Rp4,444 — 7.0% over four years, before the Rp275 per share of dividends paid in the same window [24], [25], [26]. On the company's own disclosed Bank Indonesia mid rates, the rupiah went from 14,269 to the dollar at the end of 2021 to 16,782 at the end of 2025, so in dollar terms that per-share net asset value is 9.0% lower than it was four years ago [27], [28].

The operating line beneath the marks tells the same cyclical story. Saratoga's own investor presentation tracks the aggregate revenue of its listed portfolio: Rp17,401 billion in 2018, rising to Rp58,143 billion in 2022, then falling to Rp44,728 billion in 2023 [29]. The 2021 peak in the marks was a coal price event before it was anything else — Newcastle thermal coal went from USD80 a tonne at the start of 2021 to USD150 by year-end, touching more than USD200 in the third quarter [30].

Source: Saratoga investor presentation, January 2025 [31]. The presentation also shows a nine-month 2024 figure of Rp50,091 billion, which is not comparable to the full years and is excluded here.

The internal offset and its limits

Whether the portfolio's parts hedge each other is answerable from the year-by-year changes rather than from any statement management makes.

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, net asset valuation table [32]. The five components sum to the reported Rp5,113 billion increase in the sum of investee companies.

In 2025 the coal holdings lost Rp4,160 billion of value while Tower Bersama and Merdeka gained Rp5,865 billion between them, and Saratoga attributes the year's Rp4,140 billion net investment gain specifically to those two share prices [33].

The offset is worth being precise about, because only part of it is durable. Against coal, Tower Bersama has moved the other way in every one of the last four years: coal up 71% and towers down 37% in 2022 — a move that was half ownership change, as noted above — coal down 38% and towers up 15% in 2023, coal up 83% and towers down 3% in 2024, coal down 20% and towers up 17% in 2025. Merdeka has not. It rose with coal in 2022, fell with coal in 2023, and only diverged in 2024 and 2025. The year that matters most for a reader sizing downside is therefore 2023, when Merdeka fell Rp5,985 billion and Adaro Energy fell Rp7,135 billion together and the whole portfolio dropped 20% [34]. Roughly half the portfolio is metals and coal, and those two have moved together as often as apart. The tower stake is the genuine counterweight, and it is 30.7% of the book.

The fourth holding has done neither. Mitra Pinasthika Mustika has been marked lower in every year of this record — Rp2,897 billion in 2021, then Rp2,834, Rp2,657, Rp2,492 and Rp2,442 billion — a 15.7% decline in the one operating business Saratoga controls outright.

Saratoga names a narrower version of this in its risk disclosures, where it says that "certain investments, such as in ADRO and MDKA, provide a natural hedge against the Company's U.S. dollar liabilities" [35]. That is a currency point, not a cycle point, and the dollar borrowings it hedges were down to USD15.0 million at the end of 2025, against USD50.5 million of dollar cash [36].

The company also trades around these positions more than a static holding table suggests. In 2025 it bought 121,764,199 Merdeka shares on 5 March, taking its stake to 20.08%, then sold 211,103,896 shares on 26 August, bringing it back to 19.47% — buying before a year in which Merdeka's marked price rose from Rp1,615 to Rp2,280, and trimming into it [37], [38]. Effective ownership of Alamtri rose from 15.78% to 16.52% and of Adaro Andalan from 14.21% to 15.15% over the same year, as those marks fell [39]. The filings do not separate purchases from the effect of investee buybacks, so the direction is clear but the mechanism is not.

Where management says the next capital goes

The forward sector list in the FY2025 report is short and consistent across both places it appears. The Board of Directors writes that capital is going toward "healthcare, digital infrastructure, renewables, and consumer", underpinned by demographics and the sustainability agenda and offering "multi-decade growth potential beyond cyclical trends" [40]. The Business Prospects section names the same four [41].

Against the holdings table, that list describes where the company intends to go rather than where it currently is. Tower Bersama qualifies as digital infrastructure and is 30.7% of the portfolio. Metals and coal — Merdeka, Alamtri and Adaro Andalan, 45.8% of the portfolio between them — are not named, though Alamtri's renewables arm and Merdeka's battery-materials business sit adjacent to two of the four themes. The phrase "beyond cyclical trends" is management's own characterisation of what the present portfolio is. Healthcare, renewables and consumer sit almost entirely inside the Rp11,842 billion of everything else.

The segment note shows how that smaller half is performing. Saratoga reports three segments — Blue Chip, Digital Technology and Growth Focused. In 2025 the Growth Focused segment produced Rp1,498 billion of income against a Rp288 billion loss in 2024, with reportable assets up from Rp7,393 billion to Rp9,460 billion. The Digital Technology segment lost Rp300 billion in 2025 after losing Rp266 billion in 2024, and its reportable assets fell from Rp934 billion to Rp716 billion [42]. Two consecutive loss years and a 23% decline in carrying value is a small number against a Rp60,768 billion portfolio, but it is the only part of the book where the newer strategy has a track record long enough to read.

How investee trouble reaches the balance sheet

Saratoga does not consolidate its investees and does not guarantee their debt. The FY2025 consolidated statements carry no contingent-liability note and disclose no guarantee given in favour of any portfolio company. The link the filings do disclose between an investee's share price and Saratoga's own obligations sits in the borrowings note: "The outstanding loans are secured by pledges of TBIG, MPMX, MDKA and/or ADRO shares, owned (directly or indirectly) by the Company. The Company is also required to maintain a certain minimum investment market value to debt." [43] The same wording appears in the 31 March 2026 interim statements, by which point borrowings had fallen to Rp796 billion [44].

That is a margin-loan structure, and the minimum ratio itself is not disclosed. What is disclosed is how much headroom sits above it.

Sources: loan-to-value as disclosed in the FY2021 [45], FY2022 [46], FY2023 [47], FY2024 [48] and FY2025 [49] Annual Reports; the 2020 figure is as restated in the FY2021 report.

The stress arithmetic is undemanding. The most levered recent year-end was 2024, with Rp1,670 billion of net debt against a Rp55,655 billion portfolio [50]. Repeating 2023's 20% portfolio fall from that position would have taken loan-to-value from 3.0% to 3.8%; halving the portfolio would have taken it to 6.0%. On the end-2025 position of Rp484 billion against Rp60,768 billion, a 50% portfolio fall gives 1.6% [51]. For the pledge covenant to bite, the four listed prices would have to fall by an order of magnitude more than they ever have in this record. On the evidence available, the holding company's own solvency is not where the risk in this security sits.

The risk that does sit here is mark volatility, and the audited accounts quantify it directly. A 10% move in the relevant share prices at 31 December 2025 changes reported equity and profit by Rp1,866 billion for Tower Bersama, Rp1,426 billion for Alamtri and Adaro Andalan together, Rp1,081 billion for Merdeka and Rp244 billion for Mitra Pinasthika Mustika [52].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 18 Financial Risk Management, share price risk sensitivity as at 31 December 2025 [53].

Those four sensitivities total Rp4,617 billion — 19.3% of the Rp23,874 billion market capitalisation at the 27 July 2026 close, and 7.7% of published net asset value. One disclosure detail is worth flagging. The Tower Bersama, Merdeka and Mitra Pinasthika sensitivities are each exactly one-tenth of the value the net asset valuation table carries for them. The Alamtri and Adaro Andalan line is not: it implies a base of Rp14,263 billion against the Rp17,015 billion the same accounts carry for the four coal-linked holdings, a Rp2,752 billion difference. In the FY2024 accounts the equivalent gap was Rp5,800 billion [54], [55]. The likely explanation is the "mainly" in the associates footnote — Adaro Strategic Capital and Adaro Strategic Lestari hold assets besides coal shares — but the notes do not reconcile it, and the reader is left unable to size the coal exposure to better than a Rp2.8 trillion band.

Two smaller exposures complete the picture. Saratoga carried Rp732 billion of receivables at the end of 2025, of which Rp705 billion was declared but unpaid dividends from the Adaro complex and Rp27 billion a loan to a growth company; against a gross balance of Rp798 billion the group carries Rp66 billion of impairment, down from Rp108 billion a year earlier [56], [57]. And the leverage that does exist sits at the investees, where Saratoga's own filings record it without consolidating it: Tower Bersama issued USD650 million of dollar bonds and IDR6.5 trillion of rupiah bonds in 2021 [58], IDR5.4 trillion in 2022 [59], IDR5.5 trillion in 2023 [60] and IDR4.7 trillion in 2024 [61]. Of the IDR15.6 trillion raised in rupiah over those three years, IDR13.1 trillion carried a 370-day tenor — a book that is refinanced continuously rather than termed out, alongside a USD325 million revolving facility extended to October 2029 [62]. On the mining side, Merdeka raised IDR12.0 trillion across four bonds in 2022 [63], and in 2025 alone issued a further IDR2.8 trillion while Merdeka Battery Materials issued IDR16.8 trillion of sukuk [64].

Saratoga's own risk table concedes the exposure without quantifying it, listing "Exposure to Industry Risk in Which Our Investees Operate" and answering it with diversification and "regular performance and risk reviews" [65].

What would change the read

The read here is that the four core holdings are large, liquid positions whose aggregate mark is 7.7% lower than it was four years ago; that the tower stake has offset the commodity holdings in each of those four years while Merdeka has offset them in only two; and that investee leverage is substantial but reaches Saratoga only through a pledge covenant with headroom a repeat of the worst drawdown in this record would barely touch. Three things would move it.

If Adaro Andalan and Alamtri sustain distributions through a soft coal price — the January 2026 USD250 million interim already approved is one data point [66], against USD300 million paid in June 2025 for the prior year [67] — the coal half of the portfolio behaves more like an annuity than a price bet, and the 2025 marks understate it. If the ADMR aluminium smelter ramps to its 500,000 tonne phase one and Merdeka's downstream nickel projects convert capital expenditure into cash, the metals half becomes a compounder rather than a price proxy. And if the Growth Focused segment repeats 2025's Rp1,498 billion of income for another two years, the case stops depending on the four core names at all.

The strongest fact against this read is the one that ends the section above: the Rp2,752 billion unreconciled gap between the coal carrying value and the coal sensitivity base means the exposure cannot be sized precisely from these accounts. A reader who needs that precision has to go to Alamtri's and Adaro Andalan's own filings.

Two limits on this chapter should be stated plainly. None of the investees' own financial statements are in this corpus — every operating figure above is Saratoga's description of a company it does not control, published in its own annual report, and the investee-level balance sheets that would settle a look-through leverage question are not here. And web research was unavailable throughout this run, so no commodity price data, broker work or investee disclosure after March 2026 could be checked. The related question of what the unlisted 15% of the portfolio is actually worth is unexamined, as is the record of realisations across Saratoga's full listed life.

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Realisation Record

Saratoga's own Investment Milestones chart names nine divestments in the thirteen years since it listed, none of them from the four holdings that are four-fifths of the portfolio. Across FY2021 to FY2025 the company collected Rp24,005 billion from disposals and spent Rp30,296 billion on investments. Strip out the 2022 tower restructuring, which recycled most of its own proceeds within the year, and the record is Rp3,805 billion realised against Rp12,006 billion deployed.

Nine named exits since the listing

The 2013 prospectus offered 271,297,000 new shares at Rp5,500 — Rp1,492 billion, 10.0% of the enlarged capital [1]. That prospectus defined sixteen investee companies [2]. Four of them are still identified by name in the net-asset table at 31 December 2025: Alamtri Resources (the renamed Adaro Energy, from which Adaro Andalan was separated), Tower Bersama, Mitra Pinasthika Mustika and Nusa Raya Cipta [3].

The company publishes its own record of what it sold. The Divestment row of the Investment Milestones chart carries entries in five of the thirteen listed years.

Source: Investment Milestones, FY2022 Annual Report [4] and FY2025 Annual Report [5], [6].

The chart records no divestment at all in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 or 2025 [4] [6]. The 2018 exit from Batu Hitam Perkasa, the Paiton Energy holding vehicle, is the last named sale of a large infrastructure asset. The four exits recorded since — two hospitals-and-data-centre positions in 2023, two smaller holdings in 2024 — came from the growth book, not from the blue-chip core. Saratoga has never reduced a core position other than by trading around it: Merdeka shares bought in March 2025 and partly sold in August, coal weightings raised as those marks fell, and Nusa Raya Cipta taken from 7% to 6.0% during a year in which its quoted price went from Rp352 to Rp1,525 [3].

How the company describes the activity is consistent with that record. The third pillar of its stated approach, after Invest and Grow, is Monetize: "We actively manage our investments and provide our investee companies with a broad range of capital market and strategic placement opportunities" [7]. That is capital-markets access supplied to investees, not realisation of Saratoga's own stakes. The corporate website is the only place that frames exits from the holding company's side: "When the time is right, we capitalize on well-planned exit strategies — through IPOs or trade sales — to deliver optimal returns for our stakeholders" [8].

The flows run the other way

The audited cash flow statements record disposals and purchases as separate operating lines. Over six years they look like this.

Sources: consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2021 Annual Report [9], FY2023 Annual Report [10] and FY2025 Annual Report [11].

One year dominates everything. In 2022 Saratoga received Rp20,199,792 million from sales and withdrawals of investments and paid out Rp18,289,609 million for new ones [10]. The MD&A presents the receipt as a realisation: "In 2022, Saratoga sold some of its investments and earned more than IDR20,200 billion, in comparison with IDR443 billion in the previous year" [12].

The underlying transaction was a restructuring, disclosed as a material transaction worth 32.32% of the Company's equity: Wahana Anugerah Sejahtera sold Tower Bersama shares to Bersama Digital Infrastructure Asia, and Lynwood Hills subscribed for BDIA shares [13]. Both entities are Saratoga subsidiaries. Note 5 shows Rp21,208,296 million leaving the blue-chip book and Rp17,424,532 million entering it in the same year [14], and effective ownership of Tower Bersama moved from 34.23% to 26.69%, of which 29.64% was now held through BDIA [15]. Management's own summary of the cash effect is narrower than the headline: "we also received IDR2.2 trillion from the divestment of 3% of our shareholding in PT Tower Bersama Infrastructure Tbk., as part of its successful restructuring into Digital Bersama Infrastructure Asia" [16]. The cash flow statement nets to Rp1,910 billion retained for the year.

That Rp1.9 trillion is close to what shareholders subsequently received: Rp809,836 million paid in 2022 and Rp1,013,638 million in 2023, Rp1,823 billion between them [10]. The largest realisation in Saratoga's listed history did reach the register — the qualification is that it was a recapitalisation of a stake the company still owns, not a sale of it.

Sources: derived from consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2021 [9], FY2023 [10] and FY2025 [11] Annual Reports; the June 2026 distribution is press-reported [17].

Excluding 2022, the four remaining years produced Rp3,805 billion of proceeds against Rp12,006 billion of deployment — a little over three rupiah invested for every rupiah realised. Deployment was funded in part by borrowing: Rp3,532,569 million of new bank loans was drawn in 2024 against Rp1,294,625 million repaid [11]. The direction has not changed in the current year: the first quarter of 2026 brought Rp197,251 million of proceeds against Rp97,259 million of purchases and a Rp156,000 million time-deposit placement [18].

Where the new money goes is worth noting alongside this. The FY2025 report's own funnel shows 99 opportunities screened, 8 taken to preliminary assessment, 1 term sheet and no new investments at all, against Rp2,765 billion deployed [19]. The full year's capital went into positions Saratoga already owned.

What the exits fetched

Three separate disclosures bear on whether assets leave at their carrying value.

The clearest single case is Provident Investasi Bersama. Note 5 carried the 19.87% stake at Rp884,390 million at 31 December 2023 and shows no balance a year later [20]. The MD&A's fair-value adjustment table records a Rp389 billion loss on that position during 2024, against Rp14 billion the year before [21]. The position therefore left the balance sheet at roughly Rp495 billion, about 44% below the mark it carried entering the year. Growth-focused divestments in 2024 totalled Rp598,572 million across all disposals [22], which is consistent with that reading.

Second, the parent company's tax reconciliation carries a line for loss on sale of investments and derivative instruments, added back to accounting profit. It runs Rp3,430 million for 2023, Rp173,644 million for 2024 [23] and Rp90,801 million for 2025 [24] — Rp268 billion of realised losses in three years. Two limits apply. The line is the standalone Company reconciliation, so it excludes disposals made inside subsidiaries, which is where Provident Investasi Bersama sat. And it bundles derivatives with investments. The comparatives are also unstable: the FY2022 filing showed a Rp44,940 million gain for 2022 where the FY2023 filing shows a Rp230,072 million loss, the Rp275,012 million difference having been reclassified out of the final-taxed income line [25]. The 2023 to 2025 figures are the ones that agree across filings.

Third, and quantitatively larger, part of the portfolio has left by markdown rather than by sale. Note 5's smallest two categories tell that story directly.

Sources: Note 5 summary of changes in fair values, FY2021 [26], FY2023 [14] and FY2025 [27] Annual Reports.

The digital technology book peaked at Rp525,293 million at the end of 2022 and stood at Rp51,621 million at the end of 2025 [14] [27]. Of the Rp240,092 million decline in 2025, Rp236,046 million was a fair-value change and only Rp4,046 million a divestment [27]. The Others category fell from Rp267,164 million at the end of 2020 to Rp604 million at the end of 2025 [26] [27]. Together those two buckets shed roughly Rp513 billion from their 2022 peak, almost none of it through a transaction. That is 2.1% of the Rp23,874 billion market capitalisation — small against the portfolio, but it is the part of the book where a realisation record could most easily have been built, and it was not.

The disposals themselves are not itemised. In 2025 the cash statement shows Rp1,792,437 million received while note 5 removes Rp1,195,737 million of carrying value [11] [27], and no note reconciles the two or names what was sold. The cash-flow line is also labelled "proceeds from withdrawal of investments" in 2025, where in 2023 it read "sales/withdrawal" [11] [10]. Deal-level realisation evidence is thin enough that a definitive statement about whether Saratoga's marks are achievable in a sale cannot be made from this corpus.

Buybacks and treasury shares

The second route by which a holding company can convert a discount into value for continuing shareholders is repurchasing its own stock. Saratoga has spent Rp62.5 billion on treasury shares in six years: Rp56,317 million in 2020 [9], Rp985 million in 2022 and Rp5,204 million in 2023 [10], and nothing in 2021, 2024 or 2025 [11]. That is 0.26% of the current market capitalisation, cumulative.

The holding is also shrinking rather than growing. Treasury stock stood at 15,002,100 shares carried at Rp9,833 million at 31 December 2025, down from 20,307,100 shares at Rp13,310 million a year earlier, because 5,305,000 shares were distributed to employees under the long-term incentive programme in 2025 and 8,031,900 in 2024 [28]. The remaining balance is 0.11% of issued capital [29]. The extraordinary meeting of June 2025 approved allocating up to 5,500,000 treasury shares to directors and employees [30], and the May 2024 meeting up to 8,500,000 [32]. The buyback authority in force serves compensation, not the discount. No corpus document discusses repurchasing shares to narrow the gap to net asset value.

The company also confirms it has raised no new public capital since the 2013 offering and that the IPO proceeds are fully spent [31]. Whatever the record says about returning capital, it says nothing about diluting shareholders to raise it.

Reading it, and what would change it

The evidence points to a company that compounds inside the portfolio rather than one that harvests it. Nine named exits in thirteen years, none from the core; a five-year record of deploying three rupiah for every one realised once the 2022 restructuring is set aside; a growth book whose weakest positions were written down rather than sold; and a treasury account that funds pay rather than shrinking the share count. On that record, the gap between price and net asset value has no scheduled mechanism for closing, and the reasonable base case is that it closes only if the marks themselves rise or the dividend keeps stepping up.

The strongest fact against that read is the 2022 sequence. When a genuine realisation of scale did occur, the cash was not retained: Rp1,823 billion went out as dividends across the following two payment years, close to the Rp1,910 billion the year netted [10]. The June 2026 distribution of about Rp1,401 billion followed a year in which borrowings fell to Rp1,451 billion [17] [3]. The pattern is not that realised cash gets trapped; it is that realisations are rare.

Three observable things would change the read. A sale of any part of a core holding to a third party at or near the marked price, with the proceeds distributed rather than redeployed — the marks and the willingness to convert them would both be tested at once. A treasury programme sized in the hundreds of billions of rupiah rather than tens, bought at a discount to net asset value. Or an initial public offering of an unlisted position — Brawijaya Healthcare is the largest — which would move value from a Level 3 estimate to an observable price and give the growth book its first realisation of scale. None of these has been announced in any corpus document.

Web research was unavailable throughout this run: the search provider returned an insufficient-credit error on retry for this chapter, as it did for the three before it. No post-March-2026 disclosure, broker commentary or transaction report could be checked, so the absence of a recent divestment announcement is an absence in this corpus rather than established fact.