Chapter 4

Realisation Record

Saratoga's own Investment Milestones chart names nine divestments in the thirteen years since it listed, none of them from the four holdings that are four-fifths of the portfolio. Across FY2021 to FY2025 the company collected Rp24,005 billion from disposals and spent Rp30,296 billion on investments. Strip out the 2022 tower restructuring, which recycled most of its own proceeds within the year, and the record is Rp3,805 billion realised against Rp12,006 billion deployed.

Nine named exits since the listing

The 2013 prospectus offered 271,297,000 new shares at Rp5,500 — Rp1,492 billion, 10.0% of the enlarged capital [1]. That prospectus defined sixteen investee companies [2]. Four of them are still identified by name in the net-asset table at 31 December 2025: Alamtri Resources (the renamed Adaro Energy, from which Adaro Andalan was separated), Tower Bersama, Mitra Pinasthika Mustika and Nusa Raya Cipta [3].

The company publishes its own record of what it sold. The Divestment row of the Investment Milestones chart carries entries in five of the thirteen listed years.

Source: Investment Milestones, FY2022 Annual Report [4] and FY2025 Annual Report [5], [6].

The chart records no divestment at all in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 or 2025 [7] [8]. The 2018 exit from Batu Hitam Perkasa, the Paiton Energy holding vehicle, is the last named sale of a large infrastructure asset. The four exits recorded since — two hospitals-and-data-centre positions in 2023, two smaller holdings in 2024 — came from the growth book, not from the blue-chip core. Saratoga has never reduced a core position other than by trading around it: Merdeka shares bought in March 2025 and partly sold in August [9], coal weightings raised as those marks fell, and Nusa Raya Cipta taken from 7% to 6.0% during a year in which its quoted price went from Rp352 to Rp1,525 [10].

How the company describes the activity is consistent with that record. The third pillar of its stated approach, after Invest and Grow, is Monetize: "We actively manage our investments and provide our investee companies with a broad range of capital market and strategic placement opportunities" [11]. That is capital-markets access supplied to investees, not realisation of Saratoga's own stakes. The corporate website is the only place that frames exits from the holding company's side: "When the time is right, we capitalize on well-planned exit strategies — through IPOs or trade sales — to deliver optimal returns for our stakeholders" [12].

The flows run the other way

The audited cash flow statements record disposals and purchases as separate operating lines. Over six years they look like this.

Sources: consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2021 Annual Report [13], FY2023 Annual Report [14] and FY2025 Annual Report [15].

One year dominates everything. In 2022 Saratoga received Rp20,199,792 million from sales and withdrawals of investments and paid out Rp18,289,609 million for new ones [16]. The MD&A presents the receipt as a realisation: "In 2022, Saratoga sold some of its investments and earned more than IDR20,200 billion, in comparison with IDR443 billion in the previous year" [17].

The underlying transaction was a restructuring, disclosed as a material transaction worth 32.32% of the Company's equity: Wahana Anugerah Sejahtera sold Tower Bersama shares to Bersama Digital Infrastructure Asia, and Lynwood Hills subscribed for BDIA shares [18]. Both entities are Saratoga subsidiaries. Note 5 shows Rp21,208,296 million leaving the blue-chip book and Rp17,424,532 million entering it in the same year [19], and effective ownership of Tower Bersama moved from 34.23% to 26.69%, with 4.95% still held through Wahana Anugerah Sejahtera and the balance through a 29.64% interest in BDIA [20]. Management's own summary of the cash effect is narrower than the headline: "we also received IDR2.2 trillion from the divestment of 3% of our shareholding in PT Tower Bersama Infrastructure Tbk., as part of its successful restructuring into Digital Bersama Infrastructure Asia" [21]. The cash flow statement nets to Rp1,910 billion retained for the year.

That Rp1.9 trillion is close to what shareholders subsequently received: Rp809,836 million paid in 2022 and Rp1,013,638 million in 2023, Rp1,823 billion between them [22]. The largest realisation in Saratoga's listed history did reach the register — the qualification is that it was a recapitalisation of a stake the company still owns, not a sale of it.

Sources: derived from consolidated statements of cash flows, FY2021 [23], FY2023 [24] and FY2025 [25] Annual Reports; the June 2026 distribution is press-reported [26].

Excluding 2022, the four remaining years produced Rp3,805 billion of proceeds against Rp12,006 billion of deployment — a little over three rupiah invested for every rupiah realised. Deployment was funded in part by borrowing: Rp3,532,569 million of new bank loans was drawn in 2024 against Rp1,294,625 million repaid [27]. The direction has not changed in the current year: the first quarter of 2026 brought Rp197,251 million of proceeds against Rp97,259 million of purchases and a Rp156,000 million time-deposit placement [28].

Where the new money goes is worth noting alongside this. The FY2025 report's own funnel shows 99 opportunities screened, 8 taken to preliminary assessment, 1 term sheet and no new investments at all, against Rp2,765 billion deployed [29]. The full year's capital went into positions Saratoga already owned.

What the exits fetched

Three separate disclosures bear on whether assets leave at their carrying value.

The clearest single case is Provident Investasi Bersama. Note 5 carried the 19.87% stake at Rp884,390 million at 31 December 2023 and shows no balance a year later [30]. The MD&A's fair-value adjustment table records a Rp389 billion loss on that position during 2024, against Rp14 billion the year before [31]. The position therefore left the balance sheet at roughly Rp495 billion, about 44% below the mark it carried entering the year. Growth-focused divestments in 2024 totalled Rp598,572 million across all disposals [32], which is consistent with that reading.

Second, the parent company's tax reconciliation carries a line for loss on sale of investments and derivative instruments, added back to accounting profit. It runs Rp3,430 million for 2023, Rp173,644 million for 2024 [33] and Rp90,801 million for 2025 [34] — Rp268 billion of realised losses in three years. Two limits apply. The line is the standalone Company reconciliation, so it excludes disposals made inside subsidiaries, which is where Provident Investasi Bersama sat. And it bundles derivatives with investments. The comparatives are also unstable: the FY2022 filing showed a Rp44,940 million gain for 2022 [35] where the FY2023 filing shows a Rp230,072 million loss, the Rp275,012 million difference having been reclassified out of the final-taxed income line [36]. The 2023 to 2025 figures are the ones that agree across filings.

Third, and quantitatively larger, part of the portfolio has left by markdown rather than by sale. Note 5's smallest two categories tell that story directly.

Sources: Note 5 summary of changes in fair values, FY2021 [37], FY2023 [38] and FY2025 [39] Annual Reports.

The digital technology book peaked at Rp525,293 million at the end of 2022 and stood at Rp51,621 million at the end of 2025 [40] [41]. Of the Rp240,092 million decline in 2025, Rp236,046 million was a fair-value change and only Rp4,046 million a divestment [42]. The Others category fell from Rp267,164 million at the end of 2020 to Rp604 million at the end of 2025 [43] [44]. Together those two buckets shed roughly Rp513 billion from their 2022 peak, almost none of it through a transaction. That is 2.4% of the Rp21,432 billion market capitalisation at the end of 2025 [45] — small against the portfolio, but it is the part of the book where a realisation record could most easily have been built, and it was not.

The disposals themselves are not itemised. In 2025 the cash statement shows Rp1,792,437 million received while note 5 removes Rp1,195,737 million of carrying value [46] [47], and no note reconciles the two or names what was sold. The cash-flow line is also labelled "proceeds from withdrawal of investments" in 2025, where in 2023 it read "sales/withdrawal" [48] [49]. Deal-level realisation evidence is thin enough that a definitive statement about whether Saratoga's marks are achievable in a sale cannot be made from this corpus.

Buybacks and treasury shares

The second route by which a holding company can convert a discount into value for continuing shareholders is repurchasing its own stock. Saratoga has spent Rp62.5 billion on treasury shares in six years: Rp56,317 million in 2020 [50], Rp985 million in 2022 and Rp5,204 million in 2023 [51], and nothing in 2021, 2024 or 2025 [52]. That is 0.29% of that market capitalisation, cumulative.

The holding is also shrinking rather than growing. Treasury stock stood at 15,002,100 shares carried at Rp9,833 million at 31 December 2025, down from 20,307,100 shares at Rp13,310 million a year earlier, because 5,305,000 shares were distributed to employees under the long-term incentive programme in 2025 and 8,031,900 in 2024 [53]. The remaining balance is 0.11% of issued capital [54]. The extraordinary meeting of June 2025 approved allocating up to 5,500,000 treasury shares to directors and employees [55], and the May 2024 meeting up to 8,500,000 [56]. The buyback authority in force serves compensation, not the discount. No corpus document discusses repurchasing shares to narrow the gap to net asset value.

The company also confirms that the 2013 IPO proceeds are fully spent and that it conducted no public offering of equity or debt securities during 2025 [57]. Whatever the record says about returning capital, it says nothing about diluting shareholders to raise it.

Reading it, and what would change it

The evidence points to a company that compounds inside the portfolio rather than one that harvests it. Nine named exits in thirteen years, none from the core; a five-year record of deploying three rupiah for every one realised once the 2022 restructuring is set aside; a growth book whose weakest positions were written down rather than sold; and a treasury account that funds pay rather than shrinking the share count. On that record, the gap between price and net asset value has no scheduled mechanism for closing, and the reasonable base case is that it closes only if the marks themselves rise or the dividend keeps stepping up.

The strongest fact against that read is the 2022 sequence. When a genuine realisation of scale did occur, the cash was not retained: Rp1,823 billion went out as dividends across the following two payment years, close to the Rp1,910 billion the year netted [58]. The June 2026 distribution of about Rp1,401 billion followed a year in which borrowings fell to Rp1,451 billion [59] [60]. The pattern is not that realised cash gets trapped; it is that realisations are rare.

Three observable things would change the read. A sale of any part of a core holding to a third party at or near the marked price, with the proceeds distributed rather than redeployed — the marks and the willingness to convert them would both be tested at once. A treasury programme sized in the hundreds of billions of rupiah rather than tens, bought at a discount to net asset value. Or an initial public offering of an unlisted position — Brawijaya Healthcare is the largest — which would move value from a Level 3 estimate to an observable price and give the growth book its first realisation of scale. None of these has been announced in any corpus document.

Web research was unavailable throughout this run: the search provider returned an insufficient-credit error on retry for this chapter, as it did for the three before it. No post-March-2026 disclosure, broker commentary or transaction report could be checked, so the absence of a recent divestment announcement is an absence in this corpus rather than established fact.